Explaining the Behavioral Intention towards BI Implementation in Public Administrations – A Principal-Agent Theory Approach
Business Intelligence (BI) is an established instrument to support public administrations in their management tasks by increasing their information level. BI is of special interest in the context of introducing accrual accounting in public administrations as this affects the information level of different stakeholders, leading to a possible decrease for municipal councils. The principal-agent theory can help to explain different behavioral intentions of the stakeholders concerning the introduction of BI. We employ a single qualitative case study to analyze these behavioral intentions. It shows that the introduction of accrual accounting did decrease the information level of the municipal council making the principal-agent problems possible. Furthermore, it shows that BI might be a solution for this problem. Therefore, council members show the behavioral intention to support the BI implementation while administration staff members rather resist it. Based on these finding, we discuss implications for practice and future research.
KeywordseGovernment Business Intelligence Empirical Study Organizational Change Principal-Agent Theory
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