Summary
We study a multi-issue negotiation problem where agents have private information concerning their preferences over the issues. The ignorance of agents regarding the actual solution space makes it difficult for them to come to an agreement that is both fair and efficient. To make such negotiations easier, we propose a framework that employs a third-party to act as a mediator that will guide agents towards equitable solutions on the efficient frontier. To achieve this, our mediator combines the declarations of agents into a coherent negotiation protocol that dampens the desire of agents to lie and encourages them to explore regions of the solution space that are efficient and profitable for both parties.
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Shew, J., Larson, K. (2009). The Blind Leading the Blind: A Third-Party Model for Bilateral Multi-issue Negotiations under Incomplete Information. In: Ito, T., Zhang, M., Robu, V., Fatima, S., Matsuo, T. (eds) Advances in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiations. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 233. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03190-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03190-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03189-2
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