Abstract
The Key-exchange protocol is one of the most basic and widely used cryptographic protocols in internet for secure communication. In a two-party setting, cryptographic protocol design has often ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties. Most protocols for two-party have been designed assuming that parties alternate sending their messages. We present two provably-secure protocols for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) which require not only a single round, but more efficient message transmission (from a computational perspective). The protocol provides Implicit Authentication, key independence and forward secrecy, and is analyzed in the standard model. The protocols are the first provably-secure one-round protocol for authenticated 2-party key exchange in the standard model that the message lengths are equal to the basic protocol.
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Zhang, XL. (2009). Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in One-Round. In: Hua, A., Chang, SL. (eds) Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing. ICA3PP 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5574. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03095-6_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03095-6_23
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