Abstract
The value of complex social network and the optimization of it are determined by the structure and nodes’ characteristics. Direct friction and indirect friction are defined to describe the possible exchange difficulty each node meets with its neighbors in exchange network. Exogenous intermediary and endogenous intermediary can decrease these frictions by adding links. Agent-based Simulating results show that both frictions and the optimization of them are influenced by demander and supplier rate, the exchange network structure as well as the environment constrains and exogenous intermediation acts better than endogenous intermediation in decreasing both frictions. While assists exchange, the results of this paper also implies social network as origin of impefect market.
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Li, L., Wu, B., Chen, Z., Zhao, L. (2009). Social Network as Double-Edged Sword to Exchange: Frictions and the Emerging of Intellectual Intermediary Service. In: Zhou, J. (eds) Complex Sciences. Complex 2009. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 4. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02466-5_87
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02466-5_87
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