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Password-Authenticated Group Key Agreement with Adaptive Security and Contributiveness

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Book cover Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2009 (AFRICACRYPT 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5580))

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Abstract

Adaptively-secure key exchange allows the establishment of secure channels even in the presence of an adversary that can corrupt parties adaptively and obtain their internal states. In this paper, we give a formal definition of contributory protocols and define an ideal functionality for password-based group key exchange with explicit authentication and contributiveness in the UC framework. As with previous definitions in the same framework, our definitions do not assume any particular distribution on passwords or independence between passwords of different parties. We also provide the first steps toward realizing this functionality in the above strong adaptive setting by analyzing an efficient existing protocol and showing that it realizes the ideal functionality in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models based on the CDH assumption.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. École Normale Supérieure, CNRS-INRIA, Paris, France

    Michel Abdalla, Céline Chevalier & David Pointcheval

  2. Università di Catania, Catania, Italy

    Dario Catalano

Authors
  1. Michel Abdalla
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  2. Dario Catalano
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  3. Céline Chevalier
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  4. David Pointcheval
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. Electrical Engineering-ESAT/COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, Bus 2446, 3001, Leuven, Belgium

    Bart Preneel

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Abdalla, M., Catalano, D., Chevalier, C., Pointcheval, D. (2009). Password-Authenticated Group Key Agreement with Adaptive Security and Contributiveness. In: Preneel, B. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2009. AFRICACRYPT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5580. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02384-2_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02384-2_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02383-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02384-2

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