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Motivation and a Few Cases

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Abstract

Consider two persons sharing a cab on the way home from a party. Typically, the one who gets off first either tries to avoid payment or pay some arbitrary amount (corresponding to whatever is left of cash) to the remaining passenger.

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Correspondence to Jens Leth Hougaard .

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hougaard, J.L. (2009). Motivation and a Few Cases. In: An Introduction to Allocation Rules. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01828-2_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01828-2_1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01827-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01828-2

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