Abstract
Almost all the important cryptographic protocols we have today base their security on unproven assumptions, which all imply NP \(\ne\) P, and thus having unconditional proofs of their security seems far beyond our reach. One research effort then is to identify more basic primitives and prove the security of these protocols by reductions to the security of these primitives. However, in doing so, one often observes some security loss in the form that the security of the protocols is measured against weaker adversaries, e.g., adversaries with a smaller running time. Is such a security loss avoidable? We study two of the most basic cryptographic reductions: hardness amplification of one-way functions and constructing pseudorandom generators from one-way functions. We show that when they are done in a certain black-box way, such a security loss is in fact unavoidable.
This work supported was in part by the National Science Council under the Grant NSC97-2221-E-001-012-MY3.
The original version of this chapter was revised: The copyright line was incorrect. This has been corrected. The Erratum to this chapter is available at DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_35
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Lu, CJ. (2009). On the Security Loss in Cryptographic Reductions. In: Joux, A. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2009. EUROCRYPT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5479. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_4
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