Traitors Collaborating in Public: Pirates 2.0

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5479)


This work introduces a new concept of attack against traitor tracing schemes. We call attacks of this type Pirates 2.0 attacks as they result from traitors collaborating together in a public way. In other words, traitors do not secretly collude but display part of their secret keys in a public place; pirate decoders are then built from this public information. The distinguishing property of Pirates 2.0 attacks is that traitors only contribute partial information about their secret key material which suffices to produce (possibly imperfect) pirate decoders while allowing them to remain anonymous. The side-effect is that traitors can publish their contributed information without the risk of being traced; giving such strong incentives to some of the legitimate users to become traitors allows coalitions to attain very large sizes that were deemed unrealistic in some previously considered models of coalitions.

This paper proposes a generic model for this new threat, that we use to assess the security of some of the most famous traitor tracing schemes. We exhibit several Pirates 2.0 attacks against these schemes, providing new theoretical insights with respect to their security. We also describe practical attacks against various instances of these schemes. Eventually, we discuss possible variations on the Pirates 2.0 theme.


Steiner Tree Secret Data Legitimate User Digital Right Management Direct Label 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. 1.
    AACS LA. AACS Specifications,
  2. 2.
    AACS LA. Introduction and Common Cryptographic Elements. Downloaded from,
  3. 3.
    Billet, O., Phan, D.H.: Efficient Traitor Tracing from Collusion Secure Codes. In: Safavi-Naini, R. (ed.) ICITS 2008. LNCS, vol. 5155, pp. 171–182. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Boneh, D., Franklin, M.K.: An Efficient Public Key Traitor Tracing Scheme. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 338–353. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Boneh, D., Naor, M.: Traitor tracing with constant size ciphertexts (2008)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Boneh, D., Sahai, A., Waters, B.: Fully Collusion Resistant Traitor Tracing with Short Ciphertexts and Private Keys. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4004, pp. 573–592. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Boneh, D., Shaw, J.: Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data. In: Coppersmith, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 1995. LNCS, vol. 963, pp. 452–465. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Chabanne, H., Phan, D.H., Pointcheval, D.: Public Traceability in Traitor Tracing Schemes. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 542–558. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Chor, B., Fiat, A., Naor, M.: Tracing traitors. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1994. LNCS, vol. 839, pp. 257–270. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
  11. 11.
    Electronic Frontier Foundation,
  12. 12.
    Fiat, A., Tassa, T.: Dynamic Traitor Tracing. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 354–371. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: How to construct random functions (extended abstract). In: Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science—FOCS 1984, pp. 464–479. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1984)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Hollmann, H.D.L., van Lint, J.H., Linnartz, J.-P.M.G., Tolhuizen, L.M.G.M.: On Codes with the Identifiable Parent Property. J. Comb. Theory, Ser. A 82(2), 121–133 (1998)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Kiayias, A., Pehlivanoglu, S.: Pirate Evolution: How to Make the Most of Your Traitor Keys. In: Menezes, A. (ed.) CRYPTO 2007. LNCS, vol. 4622, pp. 448–465. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Kiayias, A., Yung, M.: On Crafty Pirates and Foxy Tracers. In: Sander, T. (ed.) DRM 2001. LNCS, vol. 2320, pp. 22–39. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Kiayias, A., Yung, M.: Traitor tracing with constant transmission rate. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 450–465. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Naor, D., Naor, M., Lotspiech, J.: Revocation and tracing schemes for stateless receivers. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 41–62. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Pfitzmann, B.: Trials of Traced Traitors. In: Anderson, R. (ed.) IH 1996. LNCS, vol. 1174, pp. 49–64. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Phan, D.H.: Traitor tracing for stateful pirate decoders with constant ciphertext rate. In: Nguyên, P.Q. (ed.) VIETCRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4341, pp. 354–365. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Phan, D.H., Safavi-Naini, R., Tonien, D.: Generic Construction of Hybrid Public Key Traitor Tracing with Full-Public-Traceability. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds.) ICALP 2006. LNCS, vol. 4052, pp. 264–275. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Sarkar, P., Stinson, D.R.: Frameproof and IPP codes. In: Pandu Rangan, C., Ding, C. (eds.) INDOCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2247, pp. 117–126. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    Sirvent, T.: Traitor tracing scheme with constant ciphertext rate against powerful pirates. In: Augot, D., Sendrier, N., Tillich, J.-P. (eds.) Workshop on Coding and Cryptography—WCC 2007, April 2007, pp. 379–388 (2007)Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Stop DRM Now!,
  25. 25.
    Tardos, G.: Optimal probabilistic fingerprint codes. In: ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing—STOC 2003, pp. 116–125. ACM, New York (2003)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Orange LabsIssy-les-MoulineauxFrance
  2. 2.Université Paris 8Saint-DenisFrance

Personalised recommendations