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Dynamics of Online Scam Hosting Infrastructure

  • Maria Konte
  • Nick Feamster
  • Jaeyeon Jung
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5448)

Abstract

This paper studies the dynamics of scam hosting infrastructure, with an emphasis on the role of fast-flux service networks. By monitoring changes in DNS records of over 350 distinct spam-advertised domains collected from URLs in 115,000 spam emails received at a large spam sinkhole, we measure the rates and locations of remapping DNS records, and the rates at which “fresh” IP addresses are used. We find that, unlike the short-lived nature of the scams themselves, the infrastructure that hosts these scams has relatively persistent features that may ultimately assist detection.

Keywords

Content Distribution Network Spam Email Spam Message Spam Campaign Flux Domain 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maria Konte
    • 1
  • Nick Feamster
    • 1
  • Jaeyeon Jung
    • 2
  1. 1.Georgia Institute of TechnologyUSA
  2. 2.Intel ResearchUSA

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