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The Regulation of Political Association and Possession of Documents Under Domestic Counter-Terrorist Laws

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Abstract

In the previous chapter I argued that international law offered at best an equivocal measure of protection on unpopular expression and minority associations. The indeterminacy of international legal norms in general and the failure of the international community to agree upon a comprehensive definition of terrorism have meant that national legal systems remain centre stage in the articulation, enforcement and policing of counter-terrorist strategies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the need to agree a comprehensive definition of terrorism, see B Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (2006, OUP, Oxford) and C Walker, The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom law and beyond' [2007] PL 331.

  2. 2.

    K Roach, ‘The post-9/11 migration of Britain's Terrorism Act 2000’ in (ed. S Choudhry) The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2006, CUP, Cambridge); I Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ (2009) 68 CLJ 118.

  3. 3.

    For an overview of liberal constitutionalism, see M Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (1992, Clarendon Press, Oxford) at ch. 5. See in the current context D Kostakopolou, ‘How to do things with security post 9/11’ (2008) 28 OJLS 317 for discussion of the tensions in liberal democracies as they confront forms of international terrorism.

  4. 4.

    Resolution 1271, (2002) January 24, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe.

  5. 5.

    See for background, The Definition of Terrorism – A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Cm 7052 (2007, HMSO, London).

  6. 6.

    On the background the 2000 & 2001 reforms, see C Walker The Anti Terrorism Laws (2002, Blackstones, London). A brief overview of these measures as well as legislative developments up to the Terrorism Act 2006 is provided by the same author in ‘The United Kingdom's Anti-Terrorism Laws: Lessons for Australia’ in A Lynch, E McDonald & G Williams (eds.), Law & Liberty in the War on Terror (2007, Federation Press, New South Wales).

  7. 7.

    S. 20(1), PTA 1989.

  8. 8.

    S. 1(2), TA 2000.

  9. 9.

    S. 1(4), Terrorism Act 2000.

  10. 10.

    S. 34, Terrorism Act 2006.

  11. 11.

    S. 1(3), Terrorism Act 2000.

  12. 12.

    I Cotler, ‘Terrorism, Security and Rights: The Dilemma of Democracies’ in E Mendes & D McAllister (eds.) Between Crime and War: Terrorism, Democracy and the Constitution (2002, Thompson Carswell, Toronto) at pp. 35–6.

  13. 13.

    ‘Liberty's threat from executive power’ Sydney Morning Herald (2007), July 6.

  14. 14.

    For discussion see C Walker, The Anti Terrorism Laws (2002, Blackstones, London) at pp. 22–3 and by the same author ‘The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom law and beyond’ [2007] PL 331. It may be noted that in one respect at least – the requirement of ‘serious’ violence, damage etc. – the 2000 Act is narrower than its predecessor which referred merely to ‘violence’.

  15. 15.

    ‘Canada computer expert linked to British bomb plot’ The Times (2004) April 1. Khawaja was subsequently convicted in October 2008 for his involvement in a plot to bomb several targets in Britain, see ‘Canadian bomb plotter convicted’ on the BBC News World website at http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/7697843.stm

  16. 16.

    R v Khawaja (2006) 42 CR (6th) 348; 214 CCC (3d) 399.

  17. 17.

    See thus the Canadian Supreme Court in United States v Dynar [1997] 2 SCR 462, ‘It does not matter to society in its efforts to secure social peace and stability what an accused's motive was, but only what the accused intended to do. It is no consolation to one whose car has been stolen that the thief stole the car intending to sell it to purchase food for a food bank.’ Cory & Iacobucci JJ at para 8.1.

  18. 18.

    R v Khawaja (2006) 42 CR (6th) 348 at para 58. See also Report of Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006, Ontario, HM Queen) at pp. 355–357 Recommendation 19 for similarly expressed concerns.

  19. 19.

    K Roach, ‘The Case for Defining Terrorism With Restraint and Without Reference to Political or Religious Motive’ in A Lynch, E McDonald & G Williams (eds.), Law & Liberty in the War on Terror (2007, Federation Press, New South Wales) at p. 47. Needless to say, the ruling by a single judge that the federal Parliament had acted unconstitutionally in inserting a motive clause into Canada's anti-terror laws is controversial, see B Saul, ‘The Curious Element of Motive in Definitions of Terrorism: Essential Ingredient or Criminalising Thought’ in A Lynch, E McDonald & G Williams ibid. More generally, Charter-based judicial striking down of federal laws is still controversial, see for a flavour of the debates inter alia see P Monaghan, Politics and the Constitution, The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada (1987, Carswell, Toronto); FL Morton, Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada (3rd edn., 2002, University of Calgary Press, Calgary); L Weinrib, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada in the Age of Rights: Constitutional Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights under Canada's Constitution’ (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 699; K Roach, The Supreme Court On Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (2001, Irwin Law, Toronto); M Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (1989, Wall & Thompson, Toronto); A Hutchinson ‘Supreme Court Inc. The Business of Democracy and Rights’ in (ed G W Anderson) Rights and Democracy - Essays in UK-Canadian Constitutionalism (1999, Blackstone Press Ltd, London).

  20. 20.

    B Saul, ibid. at p. 29.

  21. 21.

    See for example the EU's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism EC, COM (2001) 521 Final, CNS/2001/0217 (2001) 6.

  22. 22.

    Saul at n. 19, p. 32.

  23. 23.

    Lord Lloyd, Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism Cm 3420 (1996) at xi & para 5.22 et seq. Lord Lloyd's preferred definition was based upon the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's operational definition.

  24. 24.

    The Definition of Terrorism – A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Cm 7052 (2007) paras. 65–66. It is difficult though to see how such a cause would not have been read as falling within the ambit of ‘political’ or ‘ideological’ purposes.

  25. 25.

    Ibid. at para. 51.

  26. 26.

    Saul n. 18 at p. 35.

  27. 27.

    ‘Blair backs police over controversial terror raid’ The Times (2006) June 4.

  28. 28.

    Details of the IPCC report into the events at Forest Gate can be accessed electronically at http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/forest_gate_2_3report.pdf

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    ‘We're victimised like Jews by the Nazis, says Muslim leader’ The Times (2007) February 3 quoting Dr Mohammad Naseem, chairman of the Birmingham Central Mosque who it was reported claimed that ‘Muslims were being labelled as a threat like the Jews were under Adolf Hitler.’ Dr Naseem was further quoted in the report as claiming that ‘Britain was turning into a police state’. He accused the Government of ‘picking on the Muslim community to pursue a political goal. The German people were told Jews were a threat. The same thing is happening here.’ The same article in The Times also quoted a noted moderate voice in the Islamic community and former leader of the Muslim Council of Britain, Sir Iqbal Sacranie. He is reported to have said ‘I wouldn't have used the Nazi reference but I know from the number of calls that we are getting that people are really disturbed by the onslaught on the Muslim community.’

  31. 31.

    But see Fikete who argues that after the events of September 11, 2001, Muslims tend to be seen by western governments as collective threats to liberal democratic values, ‘Anti-Muslim racism and the European security state’ (2004) 46 Race and Class 3.

  32. 32.

    USC Title 18 s. 2331.

  33. 33.

    Both also argued that direct democracies were vulnerable to capture by the unwise. Madison believed that the dangers posed by any one faction to the public good or minority rights would be reduced where there were many competing factions and parties across a larger territory than the city-state. More groupings operating on a grander geographical scale meant that it became ‘less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive for invading the rights of the other citizens, see J Madison, A Hamilton & J Jay, The Federalist Papers (ed. I Kramnick) (1987, Penguin, Harmondsworth) No. X. For Mill's position see his Considerations on Representative Government in HB Acton, (ed.) Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (1951, Dent, London) at p. 228.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    , Allen & Unwin, London (first published in 1942). Unlike Schumpeter however, Mill did express the hope that, over time, freedom of expression and assembly would generate greater numbers of citizens capable of holding public office.

  36. 36.

    Ibid. at 262. For criticism of Schumpeter, see P Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (1969, University of London Press, London).

  37. 37.

    For an alternative account that downplays the importance to democracy of political parties in favour of other groupings in civil society, see RA Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956, University of Chicago Press, Chicago).

  38. 38.

    G Sartori, Parties and party systems; A framework for analysis Vol 1 (1976, CUP, Cambridge) at p. 28. Over time, Sartori argues that parties ‘deviate and distort’ these demands.

  39. 39.

    BVerfGE 51 (1958). Article 2 of the Law on Political Parties defines political parties as ‘organisations of citizens who, permanently or for protracted periods seek to exert influence on the political opinion-forming process… and to participate in the representation of the people…’ The constitutional basis for this law is provided by Article 21 of the Basic Law. See also KD Ewing, ‘Transparency, Accountability and Equality – The Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act 2000’ [2001] PL 542, 544 where he suggests that parties are a ‘transmission belt’ for policy development and its carriage into legislation.

  40. 40.

    Recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1, paras. 87, 99.

  41. 41.

    G H Fox & G Nolte, ‘Intolerant Democracies’ (1995) 36 Harvard Intl LJ 1. I Cram, ‘Constitutional responses to extremist political associations – ETA, Batasuna and democratic norms’ (2008) 28 LS 68. Examples include the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991, Article 11 that proscribes parties which ‘seek the violent usurpation of the state power’ cited in C Tomuschat, ‘Democratic Pluralism: The Right to Political Opposition’ in (eds. A Rosas & J Helgesen) The Strength of Diversity (1992, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht) at p. 35.

  42. 42.

    F.2d 1197, 1200 (1978) and see N Dorsen, ‘Is there a right to stop offensive speech? The case of the Nazis at Skokie’ in (ed. L Gostin) Civil Liberties in Conflict (1988, Routledge, New York); and R Cohen-Almagor, The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance in the Struggle against Kahanism in Israel (1994, University Press of Florida, Gainsville) at 132 et seq.. Historians of the First Amendment rightly point out that this freedom was not always so generously interpreted, see the early 20th century subversive advocacy cases of Gitlow v New York 268 US 652 (1925) and Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927).

  43. 43.

    Socialist Reich Party Case (1952) 2 BVerfGE 1.

  44. 44.

    See further. I Cram, ‘Constitutional responses to extremist political associations – ETA, Batasuna and democratic norms’ (2008) 28 LS 68, 77 for brief discussion of the collapse of the Weimar Republic that provides the context for Article 21(2).

  45. 45.

    A Pedahzur, ‘The defending democracy and the extreme right’ in (eds. R Eatwell & C Mudde) Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge (2004, Routledge, London).

  46. 46.

    Countering International Terrorism – The UK's Strategy (June 2006, Home Office) available electronically at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/about-the-strategy/

  47. 47.

    Ibid., at pp. 1–2.

  48. 48.

    ‘Revealed: Britain's secret propaganda war against al-Qaida’ The Guardian (2008) August 26.

  49. 49.

    Defined under s. 121 of Terrorism Act 2000 to include any association or combination of persons.

  50. 50.

    S. 11, TA 2000.

  51. 51.

    S. 12, TA 2000.

  52. 52.

    S. 13, TA 2000. The resources of a proscribed organisation can also be seized under Part 3 of TA 2000.

  53. 53.

    Source – Home Office website accessed 06/02/2008 http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/legislation/current-legislation/terrorism-act-2000/proscribed-terrorist-groups?version = 2

  54. 54.

    S. 21 TA 2006, inserting ss.(5A-C) into s. 3 of TA 2000. Glorification is defined as including any form of praise or celebration while statements include non-verbal communications involving images and/or sounds. Other forms of ‘indirect encouragement’ seemingly do not give grounds for proscription unless this term is caught by the reference in S. 3(5A) to activities of the organisation that ensure it is associated with statements that contain glorification.

  55. 55.

    S. 3(5B), TA 2000.

  56. 56.

    The groups are Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh; Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari'at Muhammadi, see Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order, SI 2007/2184, Art 2).

  57. 57.

    S. 123(4)(a) TA 2000. Likewise, where the Home Secretary proposes the deproscribing of a banned group, affirmative resolutions from both House of Parliament are also needed.

  58. 58.

    S. 5(3) & Schedule 3, TA 2000.

  59. 59.

    S. 5(5), TA 2000.

  60. 60.

    S. 6(1), TA 2000.

  61. 61.

    [2008] EWCA Civ 433 for the Court of Appeal's refusal to interfere with POAC. I am grateful to my colleague Professor Clive Walker for alerting me to this ruling.

  62. 62.

    Ibid. at para. 47.

  63. 63.

    Ibid. in which Lord Chief Justice Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Justice Laws and Lady Justice Arden gave judgment.

  64. 64.

    See B Saul, ‘Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to Violence’ (2005) 28 UNSW Law Journal 868, 879–880 who asks in the context of equivalent Australian provisions in the Criminal Code whether an entire Mosque (assuming it qualifies as an organisation) could be shut down simply because an imam there prays for the mujahideen to be granted victory.

  65. 65.

    For description and analysis of equivalent far-reaching provisions under reforms to the div. 102 of Australian Criminal Code, see B Saul, ibid, A Lynch & G Williams, What Price Security? – Taking Stock of Australia's Anti-Terror Laws (2006, UNSW Press, Sydney) pp. 62–64. See further S Bronitt & J Stellios, ‘Security and Human Rights:’ Unbalanced Law Reform in the War on Terror'' [2006] Melb Uni L. Rev 29 which focuses more on sedition amendments to the Australian Criminal Code 1995.

  66. 66.

    Liability also arises where a person (who need not be a member) invites support for a proscribed organisation or ‘assists’ in a meeting to support or further the activities of a proscribed group. A general defence does exist to those charged with belonging or professing to belong to a proscribed organisation. This is available if the defendant can prove that the organisation was not proscribed on the last/only time at which he/she became a member; AND that the defendant has not taken part in the activities of the organisation at any time since it was proscribed, s. 11(2), TA 2000.

  67. 67.

    See for general discussion E Brems, ‘Freedom of Political Association and the Question of Party Closures’ in W Sadurski (ed.) Political Rights under Stress in 21 st Century Europe (2006, OUP, Oxford) at pp. 151–160; P Harvey, ‘Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2004) ELRev 407.

  68. 68.

    Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245.

  69. 69.

    United Communist Party v Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 121, 149; Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445.

  70. 70.

    Refah Partisi v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1, 36.

  71. 71.

    United Communist Party v Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 121, 149.

  72. 72.

    Christian Democratic People's Party v Moldova (2006) App. No. 28793/02 Judgment February 14.

  73. 73.

    United Communist Party v Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 121, 148.

  74. 74.

    The Socialist Party and others v Turkey (1998) 27 EHRR 51.

  75. 75.

    (2003) 37 EHRR 1 at para. 108.

  76. 76.

    If the act of proscription by national authorities is deemed to violate Article 11, it must follow that convictions in domestic law for membership and participation in the banned party must also violate Article 11 and possibly Article 10.

  77. 77.

    JS Mill, Utilitarianism and Other Essays (1972, Dent, London) p. 153.

  78. 78.

    JS Mill, On LibertyThe Thinker's Library, No. 5 (Watts & Co, London) p. 67

  79. 79.

    For an argument that international law may require the closure of anti-democratic parties, see E Brems, ‘Freedom of Political Association and the Question of Party Closures’ in W Sadurski (ed.) Political Rights under Stress in 21 st Century Europe (2006, OUP, Oxford) at p. 150.

  80. 80.

    P Harvey, ‘Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2004) E L Rev 407, 409.

  81. 81.

    As the first part of this chapter makes clear, it is also right to think of proscription offences as being anticipatory and disruptive to future terrorist activity. Arguably however (and a justification for slotting reference to the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle into this section of the chapter), possession of a bomb-making manual is more proximate to such activity than the fact of political association (without more) among individuals.

  82. 82.

    ‘Bombers wreak havoc in Madrid’ The Guardian (2004) March 11.

  83. 83.

    ‘Transport chaos after London blasts’ The Guardian (2005) July 7; ‘Blair says “terror will not win”’ (2005) July 7, BBC website at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4659933.stm

  84. 84.

    ‘A sense of déjà vu, but these bombs were aimed at tourists, shoppers and schoolchildren’ The Times (2005) July 22.

  85. 85.

    ‘Britain under attack as bombers strike at airport’ The Times (2007) July 1.

  86. 86.

    ‘Bomb plot targeted seven Heathrow flights, court told’ The Guardian (2008) April 3.

  87. 87.

    ‘Police in crisis after jury rejects £10m terror case’ The Times (2008) September 9.

  88. 88.

    A Goldsmith, ‘Preparation for Terrorism: Catastrophic Risk and Precautionary Criminal Law’ in A Lynch, E McDonald & G Williams (eds.), Law & Liberty in the War on Terror (2007, Federation Press, New South Wales).

  89. 89.

    C Sunstein, Issues in Legal Scholarship: Catastrophic Risks: Prevention, Compensation and Recovery: Article 3 (2007, The Berkeley Electronic Press, California) http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art3. Sunstein argues that the principle as stated above requires considerable elaboration and refinement. His cost-benefit analysis of eliminating worst-case scenarios attempts to resolve some of the problematic features of the principle. It entails assigning probabilities to the various outcomes that can be considered catastrophic and then analysing the costs of eliminating that risk.

  90. 90.

    See further A Goldsmith, ‘Preparation for Terrorism: Catastrophic Risk and Precautionary Criminal Law’ in A Lynch, E McDonald & G Williams (eds.), Law & Liberty in the War on Terror (2007, Federation Press, New South Wales) at pp. 61–64.

  91. 91.

    The 1996 Act was repealed in its entirety by the Terrorism Act 2000, s. 2(1) (b) & Schedule 16 Part 1.

  92. 92.

    An example given by the Rowe Review in 1995 was the conviction of a suspect stopped in the street and found to be carrying a quantity of twin-flex cable of the sort used for command wires in explosive devices, see Review of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 (JJ Rowe QC) Cm 2706 (1995, London, HMSO) at paras. 111–114. By 1996, the Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism – Vol. 1 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick) Cm 3420 (1996, London, HMSO) noted that there had been twenty-four convictions under the 1991 Act, para. 14.3.

  93. 93.

    See further DPP v Kebilene [1999] 3 WLR 972 for discussion in the House of Lords of the compatibility of the reverse onus clause with Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and P Roberts, ‘The Presumption of Innocence Brought Home?’ (2002) 118 LQR 41 and C Walker, Blackstone's Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation (2002, OUP, Oxford) at pp. 171–175.

  94. 94.

    Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism at para. 14.5.

  95. 95.

    Cm 2706 (1995, London, HMSO) at para. 115. Lord Lloyd's Report by contrast claimed that eight persons only had been convicted under the NI offence, see Cm 3420 at para. 14.8.

  96. 96.

    Current Law Statutes Annotated (2000) Vol. 1 (annotations by JJ Rowe QC).

  97. 97.

    ‘The United Kingdom's Anti- Terrorism Laws’ in A Lynch, E McDonald & G Williams (eds.), Law & Liberty in the War on Terror (2007, Federation Press, New South Wales) at p. 190.

  98. 98.

    Lord Carlisle, Report on the Operation in 2006 of the Terrorism Act 2000 Annex C (2007, London). Walker notes that, during 2002 when the Act was first fully in force, 22 charges were brought under s. 57 and 6 under s. 58 out of a total of 48 charges, C Walker, ‘Terrorism: Terrorism Act 2000 s. 57 – direction to jury on defence of possession of items for defensive purposes’ [2008] Crim L Rev. 72 (citing Lord Carlisle, Report on the Operation in 2002 and 2003 of the Terrorism Act 2000 Annex D (2004, London).

  99. 99.

    An ‘article’ is defined in s. 121 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as including a ‘substance or any other thing’.

  100. 100.

    R v Rowe [2007] 3 All ER 36 and see for commentary C Walker, ‘Terrorism: Terrorism Act 2000 s. 57 – direction to jury on defence of possession of items for defensive purposes’ [2008] Crim L Rev. 72.

  101. 101.

    ‘Man admits to possession of terrorism recruitment dvds’ Yorkshire Post (2008) March 15.

  102. 102.

    The Guardian (2006) February 7 and see also the Crown Prosecution Service's Press Release of February 7, 2006 at http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/archive/2006/105_06.html. Other sections of the 2000 Act may also be used where possession occurs. See also the arrest of Hicham Yezza and Rizwaan Sabir of the University of Nottingham in connection with Sabir's emailing to Yezza of a declassified document – the Al Qaeda Training Manual – freely available on a US government website. Yezza was arrested under s. 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (instigation, preparation and commission of acts of terrorism) and later released without charge although was then re-arrested on immigration charges and ordered to be removed to Algeria. ‘'Draconian Home Office fast tracks Algerian's deportation’ The Independent on Sunday (2008) May 25.

  103. 103.

    “Lyrical terrorist” convicted for jihad poems’ The Times (2007) November 8; “Lyrical terrorist” convicted over hate records’ The Guardian (2007) November 8. On the content of these publications, see chapter by M Conway, ‘Terrorist Use of the Internet and Challenges of Governing Cyberspace’ in M Dunn, V Mauer & F Krishna-Hensel (eds.), Power and Security in the Information Age: Investigating the Role of the State in Cyberspace (2007, Ashgate, Hants).

  104. 104.

    A sticker bearing that phrase was found at her home. Note however that the prosecution described her as an ‘unlikely’ Islamic extremist whilst the trial judge Peter Beaumont QC considered her ‘in many respects a complete enigma’.

  105. 105.

    The Times (2008) February 18.

  106. 106.

    Ibid.

  107. 107.

    An understandable omission perhaps given that the Crown Court trial of Malik pre-dated R v K.

  108. 108.

    For a subsequent conviction of a15 year old youth under s. 58, see R v Munshi (2008) reported in ‘Two years detention for schoolboy terrorist groomed online’ The Guardian (2008) September 20.

  109. 109.

    See E Volokh, ‘Crime-Facilitating Speech’ (2005) 57 Stan L Rev 1095.

  110. 110.

    Rice v Paladin Enterprises 128 F. 3d 233 (1997) holding that the First Amendment did not present a bar to the civil action for wrongful death (and reversing District Court on the point).

  111. 111.

    Crime-Facilitating Speech' (2005) 57 Stan L Rev 1095, 1105.

  112. 112.

    I am ignoring here the obviously legitimate interests that the intended target and criminal detection agencies would have respectively in learning about the conduct of contract killers although this argues for lawful dissemination and possession to a more limited extent.

  113. 113.

    A good recent example of which is provided by an article in The Times ‘‘Fakeproof’ e-passport is cloned in minutes’. The article revealed how new and apparently secure micro-chipped passports could be cloned relatively easily. In one instance a baby boy's passport was altered to contain an image of Osama bin Laden. When tested against the software that is recommended for identity checking purposes at international airports, the altered passport was deemed to be genuine. The article revealed details of how the cloning was carried out, The Times (2008) August 6.

  114. 114.

    S. 23, Public Order Act 1986.

  115. 115.

    S. 29G, Public Order Act 1986. This provision has since been extended to material that is inflammatory on sexual orientation grounds. See Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 s. 74, Sch 16 paras. 1, 11.

  116. 116.

    A defendant could of course be unaware that in his possession are materials covered by s. 58. Unlike s. 23(3) of the Public Order Act 1986 however, the 2000 Act lacks an express defence of being unaware, and having no reason to suspect the content of the written material. For another example where mere possession is sufficient to ground liability, see now the possession of extreme pornographic images under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s. 63. The Act does provide a defence s. 65 where there is a reasonable reason to explain the fact of possession.

  117. 117.

    ‘A Pluralist Theory of Political Rights in Times of Stress’ in W Sadurski (ed.) Political Rights under Stress in 21 st Century Europe (2006, OUP, Oxford) at p. 44.

  118. 118.

    D Kostakopolou, ‘How to do things with security post 9/11’ (2008) 28 OJLS 317, 324.

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Cram, I. (2009). The Regulation of Political Association and Possession of Documents Under Domestic Counter-Terrorist Laws. In: Terror and the War on Dissent. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00637-1_3

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