Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract)

  • Silvio Micali
  • abhi shelat
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5444)


Rational secret sharing is a problem at the intersection of cryptography and game theory. In essence, a dealer wishes to engineer a communication game that, when rationally played, guarantees that each of the players learns the dealer’s secret. Yet, all solutions proposed so far did not rely solely on the players’ rationality, but also on their beliefs, and were also quite inefficient.

After providing a more complete definition of the problem, we exhibit a very efficient and purely rational solution to it with a verifiable trusted channel.


Nash Equilibrium Solution Concept Global Memory Public Record Security Parameter 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. [ADGH06]
    Abraham, I., Dolev, D., Gonen, R., Halpern, J.: Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Robust Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing and Multiparty Computation. In: PODC 2006 (2006)Google Scholar
  2. [BP98]
    Ben-Porath, E.: Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibria outcomes by “cheap” pre-play procedures. J. of Economic Theory 80, 108–122 (1998)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  3. [CM08]
    Chen, J., Micali, S.: Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions. MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-067 (November 2008)Google Scholar
  4. [GK06]
    Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited. In: De Prisco, R., Yung, M. (eds.) SCN 2006. LNCS, vol. 4116, pp. 229–241. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. [GMW87]
    Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game. In: STOC 1987 (1987)Google Scholar
  6. [HT04]
    Halpern, J., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In: STOC 2004 (2004)Google Scholar
  7. [HP08]
    Halpern, J., Pass, R.: Game Theory with Costly Computation (manuscript, 2008)Google Scholar
  8. [IML05]
    Izmalkov, S., Micali, S., Lepinski, M.: Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design. In: FOCS 2005 (2005)Google Scholar
  9. [ILM08]
    Izmalkov, S., Lepinski, M., Micali, S.: Verifiably secure devices. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 273–301. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. [KN08a]
    Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 320–339. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. [KN08b]
    Kol, G., Naor, M.: Games for Exchanging Information. In: STOC 2008 (2008)Google Scholar
  12. [LMPS04]
    Lepinski, M., Micali, S., Peikert, C., Shelat, A.: Completely Fair SFE and Coalition-Safe Cheap Talk. In: PODC 2004 (2004)Google Scholar
  13. [LT06]
    Lysyanskaya, A., Triandopoulos, N.: Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 180–197. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. [OPRV08]
    Ong, S.J., Parkes, D., Rosen, A., Vadhan, S.: Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. On Eprint, 2008/097 (2008)Google Scholar
  15. [OR]
    Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)zbMATHGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Silvio Micali
    • 1
  • abhi shelat
    • 2
  2. 2.U. VirginiaUSA

Personalised recommendations