Foundational Choices in DOLCE

  • Stefano BorgoEmail author
  • Claudio Masolo
Part of the International Handbooks on Information Systems book series (INFOSYS)


Foundational ontologies are ontologies that have a large scope, can be highly reusable in different modeling scenarios, are philosophically and conceptually well founded, and are semantically transparent.

After the analysis and comparison of alternative theories on general notions like ‘having a property’, ‘being in time’ and ‘change through time’, this paper shows how specific elements of these theories can be coherently integrated into a foundational ontology. The ontology is here proposed as an improvement of the core elements of the ontology dolce and is thus called dolce-core.


Material Object Individual Quality Temporary Parthood Unity Criterion Stage Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Laboratory for Applied Ontology (ISTC-CNR)TrentoItaly

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