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Coalition Games and Resource Allocation in Ad-Hoc Networks

  • R. J. Gibbens
  • P. B. Key
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5151)

Abstract

In this paper we explore some of the connections between cooperative game theory and the utility maximization framework for routing and flow control in networks. Central to both approaches are the allocation of scarce resources between the various users of a network and the importance of discovering distributed mechanisms that work well. The specific setting of our study is ad-hoc networks where a game-theoretic approach is particularly appealing. We discuss the underlying motivation for the primal and dual algorithms that assign routes and flows within the network and coordinate resource usage between the users. Important features of this study are the stochastic nature of the traffic pattern offered to the network and the use of a dynamic scheme to vary a user’s ability to send traffic. We briefly review coalition games defined by a characteristic function and the crucial notion of the Shapley value to allocate resources between players. We present a series of experiments with several test networks that illustrate how a distributed scheme of flow control and routing can in practice be aligned with the Shapley values which capture the influence or market power of individual users within the network.

Keywords

Source Node Market Power Static Choice Dynamic Scheme Coalition Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. J. Gibbens
    • 1
  • P. B. Key
    • 2
  1. 1.Computer LaboratoryUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK
  2. 2.Microsoft Research CambridgeCambridgeUK

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