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A Secure Round-Based Timestamping Scheme with Absolute Timestamps (Short Paper)

  • Duc-Phong Le
  • Alexis Bonnecaze
  • Alban Gabillon
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5352)

Abstract

The aim of timestamping systems is to provide a proof-of-existence of a digital document at a given time. Such systems are important to ensure integrity and non-repudiation of digital data over time. Most of the existing timestamping schemes use the notions of round (a period of time) and round token (a single value aggregating the timestamping requests received during one round). Such schemes have the following drawbacks: (i) Clients who have submitted a timestamping request must wait for the end of the round before receiving their timestamping certificate (ii) TimeStamping Authorities (TSA) based on such schemes are discrete-time systems and provide relative temporal authentication only, i.e. all the documents submitted during the same round are timestamped with the same date and time. (iii) the TSA can tamper timestamps before the round token is published in a widely distributed media. In this paper, we define a new timestamping scheme which overcomes these drawbacks.

Keywords

Timestamping scheme Merkle tree Chameleon hash function Absolute timestamp 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Duc-Phong Le
    • 1
  • Alexis Bonnecaze
    • 2
  • Alban Gabillon
    • 3
  1. 1.Laboratoire LIUPPA, IUT de Mont de Marsan, 40004 Mont de MarsanFrance
  2. 2.Laboratoire IML, Université de la Méditerranée, 13288 Marseille cedex 09France
  3. 3.Laboratoire GePaSud, Université de la Polynésie Française, 98702 FAA’A - Tahiti - Polynésie françaiseFrance

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