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Construction of Yet Another Forward Secure Signature Scheme Using Bilinear Maps

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Provable Security (ProvSec 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5324))

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Abstract

Forward secure signatures are proposed to deal with the key exposure problem. Compared to regular signatures, forward secure signatures can protect the security of signatures previous to the time period of key exposure. The efficiency is an important issue of forward secure signatures. In this paper, we construct yet another forward secure signature scheme using bilinear maps. In this scheme, all performance parameters have complexities of log magnitude in terms of the total time periods. In addition, our scheme needs very few pairing operations in verifying algorithm, which is very important because the pairing operation is very time-consuming. At last, we prove that our scheme is forward secure in random oracle model assuming CDH problem is hard.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Information Engineering, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071, China

    Jia Yu, Xiangguo Cheng & Rong Hao

  2. Institute of Network Security, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Fanyu Kong

  3. School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan, 250101, China

    Guowen Li

Authors
  1. Jia Yu
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  2. Fanyu Kong
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  3. Xiangguo Cheng
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  4. Rong Hao
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  5. Guowen Li
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Cryptography and Security Department Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

    Joonsang Baek

  2. Institute for Infocomm Research, 119613, Singapore

    Feng Bao

  3. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 200240, Shanghai, China

    Kefei Chen  & Xuejia Lai  & 

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Yu, J., Kong, F., Cheng, X., Hao, R., Li, G. (2008). Construction of Yet Another Forward Secure Signature Scheme Using Bilinear Maps. In: Baek, J., Bao, F., Chen, K., Lai, X. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5324. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88733-1_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88733-1_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88732-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88733-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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