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Digital Signatures Out of Second-Preimage Resistant Hash Functions

  • Erik Dahmen
  • Katsuyuki Okeya
  • Tsuyoshi Takagi
  • Camille Vuillaume
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5299)

Abstract

We propose a new construction for Merkle authentication trees which does not require collision resistant hash functions; in contrast with previous constructions that attempted to avoid the dependency on collision resistance, our technique enjoys provable security assuming the well-understood notion of second-preimage resistance. The resulting signature scheme is existentially unforgeable when the underlying hash function is second-preimage resistant, yields shorter signatures, and is affected neither by birthday attacks nor by the recent progresses in collision-finding algorithms.

Keywords

Merkle signatures provable security second-preimage resistance 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Erik Dahmen
    • 1
  • Katsuyuki Okeya
    • 2
  • Tsuyoshi Takagi
    • 3
  • Camille Vuillaume
    • 2
  1. 1.Technische Universität DarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development LaboratoryJapan
  3. 3.Future University, HakodateJapan

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