NetQi: A Model Checker for Anticipation Game

  • Elie Bursztein
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5311)


NetQi is a freely available model-checker designed to analyze network incidents such as intrusion. This tool is an implementation of the anticipation game framework, a variant of timed game tailored for network analysis. The main purpose of NetQi is to find, given a network initial state and a set of rules, the best strategy that fulfills player objectives by model-checking the anticipation game and comparing the outcome of each play that fulfills strategy constraints. For instance, it can be used to find the best patching strategy. NetQi has been successfully used to analyze service failure due to hardware, network intrusion, worms and multiple-site intrusion defense cooperation.


Player Action Security Expert Attack Graph Player Objective Strategy Objective 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elie Bursztein
    • 1
  1. 1.LSV, ENS Cachan, CNRS, INRIAFrance

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