Advertisement

Implementing Two-Party Computation Efficiently with Security Against Malicious Adversaries

  • Yehuda Lindell
  • Benny Pinkas
  • Nigel P. Smart
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5229)

Abstract

We present an implementation of the protocol of Lindell and Pinkas for secure two-party computation which is secure against malicious adversaries [13]. This is the first running system which provides security against malicious adversaries according to rigorous security definition and without using the random oracle model. We ran experiments showing that the protocol is practical. In addition we show that there is little benefit in replacing subcomponents secure in the standard model with those which are only secure in the random oracle model. Throughout we pay particular attention to using the most efficient subcomponents in the protocol, and we select parameters for the encryption schemes, commitments and oblivious transfers which are consistent with a security level equivalent to AES-128.

Keywords

Elliptic Curve Random Oracle Commitment Scheme Random Oracle Model Oblivious Transfer 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Aiello, B., Ishai, Y., Reingold, O.: Priced Oblivious Transfer: How to Sell Digital Goods. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 119–135. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Aggarwal, G., Mishra, N., Pinkas, B.: Secure Computation of the k-th Ranked Element. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 40–55. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Ben-David, A., Nisan, N., Pinkas, B.: FairplayMP – A System for Secure Multi-Party Computation, manuscript (2008)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bogetoft, P., Christensen, D.L., Dåmgard, I., Geisler, M., Jakobsen, T., Krøigaard, M., Nielsen, J.D., Nielsen, J.B., Nielsen, K., Pagter, J., Schwartzbach, M., Toft, T.: Multiparty Computation Goes Live, Cryptology ePrint Archive 2008/068 (2008)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Bogetoft, P., Damgård, I., Jakobsen, T., Nielsen, K., Pagter, J.: A practical implementation of secure auctions based on multiparty integer computation. In: Di Crescenzo, G., Rubin, A. (eds.) FC 2006. LNCS, vol. 4107, pp. 142–147. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Canetti, R.: Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols. Journal of Cryptology 13(1), 143–202 (2000)zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Chaum, D., Pederson, T.P.: Wallet Databases with Observers. In: Brickell, E.F. (ed.) CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740, pp. 89–105. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2 – Basic Applications. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge (2004)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to Play any Mental Game – A Completeness Theorem for Protocols with Honest Majority. In: 19th STOC, pp. 218–229 (1987)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Hazay, C., Lindell, Y.: Oblivious transfer, polynomial evaluation and set intersection. Manuscript (2008)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Jarecki, S., Shmatikov, V.: Efficient two-party secure computation on committed inputs. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 97–114. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Kalai, Y.T.: Smooth Projective Hashing and Two-Message Oblivious Transfer. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 78–95. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Lindell, Y., Pinkas, B.: An efficient protocol for secure two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 52–78. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Malkhi, D., Franklin, M.K.: Efficiency tradeoffs for malicious two-party computation. In: Yung, M., Dodis, Y., Kiayias, A., Malkin, T. (eds.) PKC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3958, pp. 458–473. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Malkhi, D., Nisan, N., Pinkas, B., Sella, Y.: Fairplay — a secure two-party computation system. In: Proc. of 13th USENIX Security Symposium (2004)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Menezes, A.J., van Oorschot, P.C., Vanstone, S.A.: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Boca Raton (1996)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Naor, M., Pinkas, B.: Efficient oblivious transfer protocols. In: 12th SODA, pp. 448–457 (2001)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Pederson, T.P.: Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 129–140. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, http://www.secg.org/download/aid-385/sec1_final.pdf
  20. 20.
    SECG. Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC 2: Recommended elliptic curve domain parameters, http://www.secg.org
  21. 21.
    Schnorr, C.P.: Efficient identification and signatures for smart cards. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 239–252. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Shoup, V.: Sequences of games: A tool for taming complexity in security proofs. Manuscript (2004)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Woodruff, D.: Revisiting the Efficiency of Malicious Two-Party Computation. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 79–96. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Yao, A.: How to generate and exchange secrets. In: 27th FOCS, pp. 162–167 (1986)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yehuda Lindell
    • 1
  • Benny Pinkas
    • 2
  • Nigel P. Smart
    • 3
  1. 1.Dept. Of Computer ScienceBar Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael
  2. 2.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael
  3. 3.Dept. Computer ScienceUniversity of BristolBristolUnited Kingdom

Personalised recommendations