Deterrence and Defeasibility in Argumentation Process for ALIS Project

  • Michel Rudnianski
  • Hélène Bestougeff
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4884)

Abstract

Argumentation issues, which are of core importance to ALIS, are addressed through a particular category of qualitative games called Games of Deterrence. The graphs associated with those games are interpreted as sets of inferences sequences between statements in the framework of non-monotonic logic. Thus an argumentation process is interpreted as a game of deterrence, which resolution determines the truth or falsity of statements, and the possible argumentation strategies of the parties.

Keywords

acceptability ALIS argumentation attack consistency defeasibility game of deterrence graph of deterrence playability rebutting relevance strategy 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michel Rudnianski
    • 1
  • Hélène Bestougeff
    • 1
  1. 1.ORT FranceParisFrance

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