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A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling

  • Jon Feldman
  • S. Muthukrishnan
  • Evdokia Nikolova
  • Martin Pál
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4997)

Abstract

We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constraint, as well as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism is not truthful, but has a Nash equilibrium whose outcome is identical to our mechanism. Our mechanism employs a descending-price auction that maintains a solution to a certain machine scheduling problem whose job lengths depend on the price, and hence are variable over the auction.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Schedule Problem Dominant Strategy Electronic Commerce Feasible Schedule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jon Feldman
    • 1
  • S. Muthukrishnan
    • 1
  • Evdokia Nikolova
    • 2
  • Martin Pál
    • 1
  1. 1.Google, Inc.USA
  2. 2.Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyUSA

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