The Search for Equilibrium Concepts

  • Christos H. Papadimitriou
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4997)


Game Theory is about predicting the behavior of groups of rational agents whose decisions affect each other’s welfare, and such predictions are most often in the form of equilibrium concepts. There are several desiderata one might expect from an equilibrium concept: First and foremost it should be natural and convincing as a prediction of agent behavior. Then it should be universal — all games should have it, because otherwise it is an incomplete prediction. Since computer scientists became interested in Game Theory over the past decade, prompted by the advent of the Internet and its complex socioeconomic platform, another important question has been asked of an equilibrium concept: Can it be computed efficiently? Intractability makes an equilibrium concept problematic.


Nash Equilibrium Repeated Game Equilibrium Concept Congestion Game Correlate Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christos H. Papadimitriou
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science DivisionUniversity of California at BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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