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The Generalized Median Stable Matchings: Finding Them Is Not That Easy

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4957))

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Abstract

Let I be a stable matching instance with N stable matchings. For each man m, order his N stable partners from his most preferred to his least preferred. Denote the ith woman in his sorted list as p i (m). Let α i consist of the man-woman pairs where each man m is matched to p i (m). Teo and Sethuraman proved this surprising result: for i = 1 to N, not only is α i a matching, it is also stable. The α i ’s are called the generalized median stable matchings of I.

In this paper, we present a new characterization of these stable matchings that is solely based on I’s rotation poset. We then prove the following: when i = O(logn), where n is the number of men, α i can be found efficiently; but when i is a constant fraction of N, finding α i is NP-hard. We also consider what it means to approximate the median stable matching of I, and present results for this problem.

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Eduardo Sany Laber Claudson Bornstein Loana Tito Nogueira Luerbio Faria

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Cheng, C.T. (2008). The Generalized Median Stable Matchings: Finding Them Is Not That Easy. In: Laber, E.S., Bornstein, C., Nogueira, L.T., Faria, L. (eds) LATIN 2008: Theoretical Informatics. LATIN 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4957. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78773-0_49

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78773-0_49

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-78772-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-78773-0

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