Abstract
The relationship between donors and social entrepreneurs is often accompanied by diverse interest conflicts. According to Andreoni (1998, 2006), the significant and often largest part of the initial financial need of a social entrepreneur or a major new initiative of an existing charity originates from a lead donor. In this paper we consider a contracting situation in which the lead donor and the entrepreneur disagree on the optimal level of fundraising. More specifically, the lead donor dislikes high fundraising. Irrespective of the exact cause of the preference mismatch, the analysis examines how the grantor’s direct regulation of the fundraising share affects the entrepreneurial decision calculus.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Andreoni, J. (1998), Toward a theory of charitable fund-raising, Journal of Political Economy, 106(7):28.
Andreoni, J. (2006), Leadership giving in charitable fund-raising, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8(1):23.
Thornton, J. (2006), Nonprofit fund-raising in competitive donor markets, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35: 21.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Starke, C. (2008). Social Entrepreneurs, Lead Donors and the Optimal Level of Fundraising. In: Kalcsics, J., Nickel, S. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2007. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 2007. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77903-2_37
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77903-2_37
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77902-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77903-2
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsBusiness and Management (R0)