Abstract
Our paper first reviews some of the most critical issues related to the introduction of Chip & PIN card payment authorisation, and then outlines one part of our experiment that we decided to undertake to validate some of our views and ideas. Our experiment examines, in two phases, whether introduction of this authorisation method is advantageous for an opportunistic thief and whether the customer truly benefits from the Chip & PIN technology with respect to this opportunistic thief.
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References
Kuhn, M.: Probability Theory for Pickpockets – ec-PIN Guessing. COAST Laboratory, Purdue University, USA, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ec-pin-prob.pdf
Hargrave, J.: Credit Card Prank. http://www.zug.com/pranks/credit/
Anderson, R., Bond, M., Murdoch, S.: Chip and Spin. Paper available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/spin/spin.pdf webpage “Chip and SPIN!” at http://www.chipandspin.co.uk/
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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Cvrcek, D., Krhovjak, J., Matyas, V. (2007). PIN (and Chip) or Signature: Beating the Cheating?. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4631. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77156-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77156-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77155-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77156-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)