Abstract
In this chapter, I will argue that children are a special subgroup of society in that they represent an opportunity for gain for the whole society. Self-interested individuals acting atomistically are not motivated to contribute optimally, if they contribute at all, to the realization of this social opportunity. Societal opportunities can be approached as public goods, giving the government a positive role. However, I will argue that the financing of a public good by means of general taxation violates the public good argument. Such a financing method requires, in addition to the public goods argument, a moral or merit good argument. I will endeavor to provide such an argument. I will also explicitly argue that the current method of providing child support in the United States is defective, as it is neither efficient nor just.
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References
“Efficient, inefficient, and socially optimal configurations can be theoretically defined... it will pay for each rational man to dissemble, trying to mask his preference for the public goods” (Samuelson 1958, 334).
See also the special supplement to Public Choice, vol. XXIX, 1977 devoted to demand revealing processes.
Some authors use this point to object to the concept of public goods (Malkin & Wildavsky 1991, 355–78, particularly 372–73) or to limit the right of the government to provide public goods (Schmidtz 1991, 158–59). See chapter 6 for more detailed discussion of this point.
Some authors argue that every public good voted for by a majority against the will of a minority must be considered as having a merit good aspect for the minority. That merit good aspect often relates to the financing system disliked by the defeated minority (Priddat 1992, 246). I made the same argument about financing methods for education in Chapter 5, Conclusion.
In the early 1990’s, both the Clinton Democrats and the Gingrich Republicans defended new forms of child support. Mandate for Change (Kamarck and. Gallston 1993, 153–78), expressing the thinking of the Democratic Leadership Council, recommended an $800 per child tax credit for all preschool children. The fifth bill of the GOP’s Contract with America, called “The American Dream Restoration Act,” recommended, among other things, a $500 per child tax credit.
See 1994, 1040. Form and Instructions. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 53.
This change in method could also simplify the tax code as the current phasing out requires eight different steps. (IRS 1994, 1040 Forms and Instructions, p. 24).
In 1995 the child tax credit was phased out for incomes above $200,000 (office of Representative John T. Doolittle of California). In 1999 calculations for the phasing out of the $500 child tax credit start at $110,000 income when married filling jointly (IRS 1999, 43).
In 2003 the child tax credit was not phased out for high incomes (IRS 2003, 40–41).
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(2008). Unjust Redistribution in the American System. In: Ethical Dimensions of the Economy. Studies in Economics Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77111-1_9
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