Ad Auction Design and User Experience

  • Zoë Abrams
  • Michael Schwarz
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4858)


When users click on poor quality advertisements, there is a hidden cost to the search engine due to the user dissatisfaction (for instance, users are less likely to click on ads in the future). We describe how to incorporate hidden costs into the GSP auction for internet ads such that it is in an advertiser’s self interest to create a user experience that maximizes efficiency.


Search Engine User Experience Shopping Mall Price Auction Auction Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zoë Abrams
    • 1
  • Michael Schwarz
    • 2
  1. 1.Yahoo!, Inc., 2821 Mission College Blvd., Santa Clara, CAUSA
  2. 2.Yahoo! Research, 1950 University Ave., Berkeley, CAUSA

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