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On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems

  • Aristotelis Giannakos
  • Laurent Gourvès
  • Jérôme Monnot
  • Vangelis Th. Paschos
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4858)

Abstract

We introduce and study a congestion game having max sat as an underlying structure and show that its price of anarchy is 1/2. The main result is a redesign of the game leading to an improved price of anarchy of 2/3 from which we derive a non oblivious local search algorithm for max sat with locality gap 2/3. A similar congestion min sat game is also studied.

Keywords

price of anarchy non oblivious local search approximation algorithm max sat 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aristotelis Giannakos
    • 1
  • Laurent Gourvès
    • 1
  • Jérôme Monnot
    • 1
  • Vangelis Th. Paschos
    • 1
  1. 1.LAMSADE, CNRS UMR 7024, Université de Paris-Dauphine, ParisFrance

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