Abstract
Security protocols are small programs that are executed in hostile environments. Many results and tools have been developed to formally analyze the security of a protocol. However even when a protocol has been proved secure, there is absolutely no guarantee if the protocol is executed in an environment where other protocols, possibly sharing some common identities and keys like public keys or long-term symmetric keys, are executed.
In this paper, we show that whenever a protocol is secure, it remains secure even in an environment where arbitrary protocols are executed, provided each encryption contains some tag identifying each protocol, like e.g. the name of the protocol.
Keywords
- Security Protocol
- Deduction System
- Constraint System
- Security Property
- Cryptographic Protocol
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This work has been partly supported by the RNTL project POSÉ and the ARA SSIA Formacrypt.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Abadi, M., Needham, R.M.: Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols. IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 22(1), 6–15 (1996)
Amadio, R., Charatonik, W.: On name generation and set-based analysis in the Dolev-Yao model. In: Brim, L., Jančar, P., Křetínský, M., Kucera, A. (eds.) CONCUR 2002. LNCS, vol. 2421, pp. 499–514. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Andova, S., Cremers, C., Steen, K.G., Mauw, S., lsnes, S.M., Radomirović, S.: Sufficient conditions for composing security protocols. Information and Computation (to appear, 2007)
Blanchet, B.: An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on Prolog rules. In: CSFW 2001. Proc. 14th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 82–96. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2001)
Blanchet, B., Podelski, A.: Verification of cryptographic protocols: Tagging enforces termination. In: Gordon, A.D. (ed.) ETAPS 2003 and FOSSACS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2620, Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In: FOCS 2001. Proc. 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Las Vegas (Nevada, USA), pp. 136–145. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2001)
Canetti, R., Meadows, C., Syverson, P.F.: Environmental requirements for authentication protocols. In: Okada, M., Pierce, B.C., Scedrov, A., Tokuda, H., Yonezawa, A. (eds.) ISSS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2609, pp. 339–355. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Comon-Lundh, H., Cortier, V.: Security properties: two agents are sufficient. Science of Computer Programming 50(1-3), 51–71 (2004)
Comon-Lundh, H., Shmatikov, V.: Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive or. In: LICS 2003. Proc. 18th Annual Symposium on Logic in Comp. Science, pp. 271–280. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2003)
Cortier, V., Delaitre, J., Delaune, S.: Safely composing security protocols. Research Report 6234, INRIA, p. 26(2007)
Cortier, V., Zalinescu, E.: Deciding key cycles for security protocols. In: Hermann, M., Voronkov, A. (eds.) LPAR 2006. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 4246, pp. 317–331. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J.C., Roy, A.: Protocol composition logic (PCL). Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 172, 311–358 (2007)
Gong, L., Syverson, P.: Fail-stop protocols: An approach to designing secure protocols. In: Proc. 5th Inter. Working Conference on Dependable Computing for Critical Applications, pp. 44–55 (1995)
Guttman, J.D., Thayer, F.J.: Protocol independence through disjoint encryption. In: CSFW 2000. Proc. 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 24–34. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2000)
Kelsey, J., Schneier, B., Wagner, D.: Protocol interactions and the chosen protocol attack. In: Christianson, B., Lomas, M. (eds.) Security Protocols. LNCS, vol. 1361, pp. 91–104. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Lowe, G.: Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In: Margaria, T., Steffen, B. (eds.) TACAS 1996. LNCS, vol. 1055, pp. 147–166. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Millen, J.K., Shmatikov, V.: Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis. In: CCS 2001. Proc. 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 166–175. ACM Press, New York (2001)
Needham, R., Schroeder, M.: Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers. Communication of the ACM 21(12), 993–999 (1978)
Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: Protocol insecurity with finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete. Theoretical Comp. Sc. 299, 451–475 (2003)
Seidl, H., Verma, K.N.: Flat and one-variable clauses: Complexity of verifying cryptographic protocols with single blind copying. In: Baader, F., Voronkov, A. (eds.) LPAR 2004. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3452, Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Cortier, V., Delaitre, J., Delaune, S. (2007). Safely Composing Security Protocols. In: Arvind, V., Prasad, S. (eds) FSTTCS 2007: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. FSTTCS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4855. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77050-3_29
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77050-3_29
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77049-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77050-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)