How to do Things with Cryptographic Protocols

  • Joshua D. Guttman
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4846)


When a distributed system may need to operate in the presence of an adversary, when it must support the activities of parties that do not trust one another fully, then cryptographic protocols will play a fundamental role in its design. One example of their importance is their ability to allow principals to agree on keys that will be shared for a session with an authenticated peer. But more fundamentally, a cryptographic protocol is a mechanism to achieve agreement among specific sets of peers, whether on keys or other values. Thus, they can play a fundamental role in organizing transactions in distributed systems, and coordinating interactions among principals.


Trust Management Computer Security Cryptographic Protocol Strand Space Money Order 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joshua D. Guttman
    • 1
  1. 1.The MITRE Corporation 

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