Abstract
We present the first protocol for the anonymous transmission of a quantum state that is information-theoretically secure against an active adversary, without any assumption on the number of corrupt participants. The anonymity of the sender and receiver, as well as the privacy of the quantum state, are perfectly protected except with exponentially small probability. Even though a single corrupt participant can cause the protocol to abort, the quantum state can only be destroyed with exponentially small probability: if the protocol succeeds, the state is transferred to the receiver and otherwise it remains in the hands of the sender (provided the receiver is honest).
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Brassard, G., Broadbent, A., Fitzsimons, J., Gambs, S., Tapp, A. (2007). Anonymous Quantum Communication. In: Kurosawa, K. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2007. ASIACRYPT 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4833. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76900-2_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76900-2_28
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