The impact of digitisation on the desirability of copyright exceptions

Abstract

In the Introduction, the most important changes that digitisation has brought to the economics of creativity and to the dissemination of information were focused upon. The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on how the operation of technological protection measures and rights management technologies, such as DRM systems, has impacted upon the social desirability of copyright exceptions.

Keywords

Intellectual Property Market Failure Free Riding Copyright Protection Compulsory License 
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References

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