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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 4767))

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Abstract

In this paper we offer a novel methodology for verifying correctness of (timed) security protocols. The idea consists in computing the time of a correct execution of a session and finding out whether the Intruder can change it to shorter or longer by an active attack. Moreover, we generalize the correspondence property so that attacks can be also discovered when some time constraints are not satisfied. As case studies we verify generalized authentication of KERBEROS, TMN, Neumann Stubblebine Protocol, Andrew Secure Protocol, WMF, and NSPK.

The authors acknowledge partial support from the Ministry of Science and Information Society Technologies under grant number 3 T11C 011 28 and N516 038 31/3853.

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Farhad Arbab Marjan Sirjani

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Jakubowska, G., Penczek, W. (2007). Is Your Security Protocol on Time ?. In: Arbab, F., Sirjani, M. (eds) International Symposium on Fundamentals of Software Engineering. FSEN 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4767. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75698-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75698-9_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-75697-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-75698-9

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