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International Conference on Provable Security

ProvSec 2007: Provable Security pp 68–84Cite as

A CDH-Based Strongly Unforgeable Signature Without Collision Resistant Hash Function

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 4784)

Abstract

Unforgeability of digital signatures is closely related to the security of hash functions since hashing messages, such as hash-and-sign paradigm, is necessary in order to sign (arbitrarily) long messages. Recent successful collision finding attacks against practical hash functions would indicate that constructing practical collision resistant hash functions is difficult to achieve. Thus, it is worth considering to relax the requirement of collision resistance for hash functions that is used to hash messages in signature schemes. Currently, the most efficient strongly unforgeable signature scheme in the standard model which is based on the CDH assumption (in bilinear groups) is the Boneh-Shen-Waters (BSW) signature proposed in 2006. In their scheme, however, a collision resistant hash function is necessary to prove its security. In this paper, we construct a signature scheme which has the same properties as the BSW scheme but does not rely on collision resistant hash functions. Instead, we use a target collision resistant hash function, which is a strictly weaker primitive than a collision resistant hash function. Our scheme is, in terms of the signature size and the computational cost, as efficient as the BSW scheme.

Keywords

  • digital signature
  • strong unforgeability
  • target collision resistant hash function
  • standard model

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan

    Takahiro Matsuda & Kanta Matsuura

  2. Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Tokyo, Japan

    Nuttapong Attrapadung, Goichiro Hanaoka & Hideki Imai

  3. Faculty of Science and Engineering, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan

    Hideki Imai

Authors
  1. Takahiro Matsuda
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  2. Nuttapong Attrapadung
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  3. Goichiro Hanaoka
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  4. Kanta Matsuura
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  5. Hideki Imai
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Editor information

Willy Susilo Joseph K. Liu Yi Mu

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Matsuda, T., Attrapadung, N., Hanaoka, G., Matsuura, K., Imai, H. (2007). A CDH-Based Strongly Unforgeable Signature Without Collision Resistant Hash Function. In: Susilo, W., Liu, J.K., Mu, Y. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4784. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75670-5_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75670-5_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-75669-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-75670-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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