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Two-Sided Statistical Disclosure Attack

  • George Danezis
  • Claudia Diaz
  • Carmela Troncoso
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4776)

Abstract

We introduce a new traffic analysis attack: the Two-sided Statistical Disclosure Attack, that tries to uncover the receivers of messages sent through an anonymizing network supporting anonymous replies. We provide an abstract model of an anonymity system with users that reply to messages. Based on this model, we propose a linear approximation describing the likely receivers of sent messages. Using simulations, we evaluate the new attack given different traffic characteristics and we show that it is superior to previous attacks when replies are routed in the system.

Keywords

Target User Normal Message Anonymous Communication Anonymity System Real Receiver 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Danezis
    • 1
  • Claudia Diaz
    • 1
  • Carmela Troncoso
    • 1
  1. 1.K.U. Leuven, ESAT/COSIC, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-HeverleeBelgium

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