Performance Comparison of Low-Latency Anonymisation Services from a User Perspective

  • Rolf Wendolsky
  • Dominik Herrmann
  • Hannes Federrath
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4776)


Neither of the two anonymisation services Tor and AN.ON clearly outperforms the other one. AN.ON’s user-perceived QoS is generally more consistent over time than Tor’s. While AN.ON’s network latencies are low compared to Tor, it suffers from limitations in bandwidth. Interestingly, Tor’s performance seems to depend on the time of day: it increases in the European morning hours. Utilising AN.ON’s reporting of concurrently logged-in users, we show a correlation between load and performance. The reported number of users should be adjusted, though, so that it serves as a better indicator for security and performance. Finally, the results indicate the existence of an overall tolerance level for acceptable latencies of approximately 4 seconds, which should be kept in mind when designing low-latency anonymisation services.


User Number User Perspective Concurrent User Afternoon Period Anonymisation Service 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rolf Wendolsky
    • 1
  • Dominik Herrmann
    • 1
  • Hannes Federrath
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Regensburg, 93040 RegensburgGermany

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