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Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries

  • Steven J. Murdoch
  • Piotr Zieliński
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4776)

Abstract

Existing low-latency anonymity networks are vulnerable to traffic analysis, so location diversity of nodes is essential to defend against attacks. Previous work has shown that simply ensuring geographical diversity of nodes does not resist, and in some cases exacerbates, the risk of traffic analysis by ISPs. Ensuring high autonomous-system (AS) diversity can resist this weakness. However, ISPs commonly connect to many other ISPs in a single location, known as an Internet eXchange (IX). This paper shows that IXes are a single point where traffic analysis can be performed. We examine to what extent this is true, through a case study of Tor nodes in the UK. Also, some IXes sample packets flowing through them for performance analysis reasons, and this data could be exploited to de-anonymize traffic. We then develop and evaluate Bayesian traffic analysis techniques capable of processing this sampled data.

Keywords

Autonomous System Internet Service Provider Random Delay Border Gateway Protocol Traffic Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven J. Murdoch
    • 1
  • Piotr Zieliński
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory 

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