Computing Proper Equilibria of Zero-Sum Games
Conference paper
Abstract
We show that a proper equilibrium of a matrix game can be found in polynomial time by solving a linear (in the number of pure strategies of the two players) number of linear programs of roughly the same dimensions as the standard linear programs describing the Nash equilibria of the game.
Keywords
Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Game Tree Matrix Game
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