Skip to main content
  • 378 Accesses

Abstract

Economic policy is often the outcome of a (political) game-contest between interest groups. Moreover, the contest between interest groups frequently involves a struggle between one group that defends the status-quo and other groups that challenge it by fighting for alternative policies. For example, a tax reform may involve a struggle between different industries. Existing pollution standards may be defended by the industry and challenged by an environmentalist interest group. A monopoly can face the opposition of a customers coalition fighting for appropriate regulation. Capital owners and a workers union can be engaged in a contest that determines the minimum wage, and so on. The outcome of the contest depends on the stakes of the contestants and, in turn, on their exerted (fighting, lobbying, rent-seeking) efforts. The realized, ex-post, payoff configuration of the interest groups depends on the policy proposal that actually emerges as the winner of the contest.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

(2007). Strategic Restraint. In: Endogenous Public Policy and Contests. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74818-2_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics