Abstract
I’ve felt Hugo’s influence in so many ways, but here are three examples. First, the way he talked about his subject helped me to believe it was something I could spend my professional life on. Second, when I expressed an interest in writing a Finance dissertation, Hugo introduced me to his friend Rich Kihlstrom, who met with me once a week at Penn and became an unofficial member of my committee. Third, I can’t imagine that I would have studied mathematics (or met my wife, Yan) after leaving Princeton, if not for Hugo.
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Dudey, M. (2008). Marc Dudey on Hugo F. Sonnenschein. In: Jackson, M.O., McLennan, A. (eds) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74057-5_15
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