Abstract
This paper was an obvious one to include because it not only ties in with Hugo’s research and interests, but also owes much to his personal side. On the research side, it deals with Hugo’s interests both in strategy-proofness and incentives, as well as foundations of behavior in exchange economies, and it makes use of some key tools from work of his together with Mark Satterthwaite (“Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms at differentiable points,” Mark Satterthwaite and Hugo Sonnenschein, Review of Economic Studies, (1981)). But, perhaps most importantly, its genesis owes much to Hugo’s direct and indirect personal touch, which both set me on a path which led to this paper and introduced me to my co-author Salvador Barberá.
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BarberÀ, S., Jackson, M.O. (2008). Matthew O. Jackson on Hugo F. Sonnenschein. In: Jackson, M.O., McLennan, A. (eds) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74057-5_14
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