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Covert Channel Invisibility Theorem

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Computer Network Security (MMM-ACNS 2007)

Abstract

We consider a sequence of finite products of a finite set. A statistical test problem is defined on every product. Consistent sequences of probability measures on these products of the set generate probability measures on the set of infinite sequences. Sufficient conditions of nonexistence for consistent test sequences are proved. These results may be interpreted from the point of view of covert channel secrecy.

This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, grant 07-01-00484, grant 07-07-00236.

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Grusho, A., Grebnev, N., Timonina, E. (2007). Covert Channel Invisibility Theorem. In: Gorodetsky, V., Kotenko, I., Skormin, V.A. (eds) Computer Network Security. MMM-ACNS 2007. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73986-9_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73986-9_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73985-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-73986-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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