Offline/Online Mixing

  • Ben Adida
  • Douglas Wikström
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4596)


We introduce an offline precomputation technique for mix-nets that drastically reduces the amount of online computation needed. Our method can be based on any additively homomorphic cryptosystem and is applicable when the number of senders and the maximal bit-size of messages are relatively small.


Bulletin Board Ideal Functionality Cryptology ePrint Archive Universal Composability Ideal Adversary 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ben Adida
    • 1
  • Douglas Wikström
    • 1
  1. 1.Harvard, Center for Research on Computation and Society 

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