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Constant-Round Private Database Queries

  • Nenad Dedic
  • Payman Mohassel
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4596)

Abstract

We consider several private database query problems. The starting point of this work is the element rank problem: the server holds a database of n integers, and the user an integer q; the user wishes to find out how many database records are smaller than q, without revealing q; nothing else about the database should be disclosed. We show a non-interactive communication-efficient solution to this problem. We then use it to solve more complex private database queries: range queries, range queries in plane and higher-dimensional generalizations of element rank. We also show an improved solution to the k th ranked element problem [1], and a solution to private keyword search [9] using weaker assumptions than those of [9]. All our solutions assume semi-honest adversarial behaviour.

Keywords

Range Query Communication Complexity Homomorphic Encryption Oblivious Transfer Private Information Retrieval 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nenad Dedic
    • 1
  • Payman Mohassel
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, Boston University 
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science, University of California Davis 

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