Skip to main content

The Theory of Maximal Social Welfare Feasible Coalition

  • Conference paper

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNAI,volume 4570)

Abstract

This paper proposes a new theory for forming a maximum-value-cooperation coalition known as the Maximal Social Welfare Feasible Coalition. This theory can give such solution because it does not assume that each player requesting to join a coalition knows information of other players. However, all players’ private information requesting to join the coalition is known by an honest coordinator. This allows the coordinator to select a coalition structure with maximal value of cooperation among successful players so as they get at least at their required minimum values. Not only this maximal value is shown to be equal to or larger than the value of a core coalition but also the value allocation is shown to be Pareto optimal.

Keywords

  • cooperative game theory
  • coalition formation
  • Pareto optimality
  • the core
  • group buying

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73325-6_93
  • Chapter length: 8 pages
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
eBook
USD   149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • ISBN: 978-3-540-73325-6
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
Softcover Book
USD   189.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aumann, R.J., Maschler, M.: The bargaining set for cooperate games. In: Advances in Game Theory (Annals of Mathematics Studies 52), pp. 443–477. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1964)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Gillies, D.B.: Solutions to general non-zero-sum games. In: Contributions to the Theory of Games 5 (Annals of Mathematics Studies 40), pp. 47–85. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1959)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Straffin, P. D.: Game Theory and Strategy. The Mathematical Association of America (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Shapley, L.S.: A value of n-person games. In: Contributions to the Theory of Games 2 (Annals of Mathematics Studies 28), vol. 2, pp. 307–317. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1953)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Wilson, R.: Information, efficiency and the core of an economy. Econometrica 46, 807–816 (1978)

    MATH  CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  6. Yannelis, N.C.: The core of an economy with differential information. Economic Theory 1, 183–198 (1991)

    MATH  CrossRef  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2007 Springer Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Boongasame, L., Boonjing, V., Leung, Hf. (2007). The Theory of Maximal Social Welfare Feasible Coalition. In: Okuno, H.G., Ali, M. (eds) New Trends in Applied Artificial Intelligence. IEA/AIE 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4570. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73325-6_93

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73325-6_93

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73322-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-73325-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)