Abstract
The traditional non-cooperative game theory is neither Pareto optimal nor fair. It will lead to the loss of efficiency among the homogeneous network services. In this paper, a cooperative game theory based network resource negotiation model carried on by agents is presented. Compared with previous research, the current work focuses on efficiency and fairness. Its chief aim is to utilize cooperation and aggregated of the homogeneous services. The model is based on the idea of the asymmetric NBS (Nash Bargaining Solution) and coalitional game from cooperative game theory. Then a two-stage negotiation algorithm is presented. The homogeneous network services coalition reaches agreement by multi-lateral negotiation using the algorithm. Finally the comparison analysis results demonstrate the advantages of the model.
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Bian, ZA., Luo, JZ. (2007). A Cooperative Game Theory Based Coalitional Agent Negotiation Model in Network Service. In: Shen, W., Luo, J., Lin, Z., Barthès, JP.A., Hao, Q. (eds) Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design III. CSCWD 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4402. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72863-4_46
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72863-4_46
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72862-7
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