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Public Choice and New Institutional Economics

A Comparative Analysis in Search of Co-operation Potentials

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Public Economics and Public Choice

Abstract

The Public Choice-approach has been characterised as the ‘application of economics to political science’ (Mueller 2003, p 1). It applies the methodology of economics to the study of politics (Mueller 1997, p 1). It is interdisciplinary insofar as it employs the analytic tools of economics and chooses as its subject matter the identical fields as political science does (Mueller 2003, p 1).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin

    Christian Kirchner

Authors
  1. Christian Kirchner
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Informationsgesellschaft und Wettbewerb, DIW Berlin, Königin-Luise-Straße 5, 14195, Berlin, Germany

    Pio Baake

  2. Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstr. 28 VGB III, 80539, München, Germany

    Rainald Borck

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Kirchner, C. (2007). Public Choice and New Institutional Economics. In: Baake, P., Borck, R. (eds) Public Economics and Public Choice. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72782-8_2

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