The Hardness of Selective Network Design for Bottleneck Routing Games

  • Haiyang Hou
  • Guochuan Zhang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4484)


In this paper, motivated by the work of Azar et al. [3] we consider selective network design on bottleneck routing games. Assuming P NP we achieve the following results. For the unsplittable bottleneck games the trivial algorithm is a best possible approximation algorithm. For the k-splittable unweighted bottleneck games it is NP-hard to compute a best pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover no polynomial time algorithms can have a constant approximation ratio if the edge latency functions are continuous and non-decreasing.


Performance Function Network Design Problem Congestion Game Bandwidth Request Network Bottleneck 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Haiyang Hou
    • 1
  • Guochuan Zhang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Mathematics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027China

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