Abstract
Considering the fact that there exist information asymmetry (hidden information) in routing phase, and moral hazard (hidden action) in forwarding phase in autonomous Ad hoc network, this paper argues that economic-based mechanisms play both a signaling and a sanctioning role, which reveal the node’s true forwarding cost in routing phase while provide incentives to nodes to exert reasonable effort in forwarding phase, that is, the role of economic-inspired mechanisms in information asymmetry is to induce learning whereas the role of such mechanisms in moral hazard settings is to constrain behavior. Specifically, this paper conducts the following works: considering the mutually dependent link cost, we demonstrate that, for each participant, truth-telling is the risk dominant strategy in VCG-like routing mechanism based on analysis of extensive game form. Then, Individual rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are formally offered, which should be satisfied by any game theoretical routing and forwarding scheme. And different solution concepts are investigated to characterize the economic meanings of two kind forwarding approaches, that is, Nash equilibrium with no per-hop monitoring and dominant strategy equilibrium with per-hop monitoring.
Research supported by the NSFC Grants 60472067, JiangSu education bureau (5KJB510091) and State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT).
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Wang, Y., Hori, Y., Sakurai, K. (2007). Studying on Economic-Inspired Mechanisms for Routing and Forwarding in Wireless Ad Hoc Network. In: Cai, JY., Cooper, S.B., Zhu, H. (eds) Theory and Applications of Models of Computation. TAMC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72504-6_33
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72504-6_33
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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