Skip to main content

Internet Experiment

  • Chapter
Preferences in Negotiations

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 595))

  • 997 Accesses


Whether the attachment effect is present and reference-dependent preferences change systematically in multi-issue negotiations is empirically tested in two closely related experiments. In this chapter, an internet experiment that tests the existence of an attachment effect in negotiation is outlined. The results support the assumption that the preferences of negotiators are systematically affected by the offers exchanged. However—as with any experiment—the external validity of results might be questioned: an single experiment can never proof that the same results would emerge if any of the numerous design choices would be altered. To increase validity, a second experiment was conducted; it is reported in Chapter 5. The design of this second experiment is refined by lessons learned from the first experiment and purposefully differs in several respects to show that the attachment effect is not closely related to the design choices made.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
EUR 32.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or Ebook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others


  1. Parts of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are closely related to Gimpel (2007).

    Google Scholar 

  2. Curhan, Neale, and Ross (2004) use a within-subject comparison of preferences in an experiment on endogenously changing preferences in negotiations. Preference elicitation for each of ten potential contracts is achieved by subjects rating these contracts on Likert scales. To reduce consistency induced by subjects awareness of multiple preference elicitations, the order of the contracts to be rated varied from elicitation to elicitation.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Turel (2006) notes, for example, that the fact that most negotiation data is collected from dyads of negotiators has statistical implications for the analysis. Simply assuming independency of individuals-as it is done by some researchers-can lead to incorrect inferences. See as well Kenny and Judd (1986, 1996) for a discussion of the statistical challenge.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Sanfey et al. (2003, p. 1758) address the issue of deception in their endnotes 14 and 15. They classify this procedure as ‘limited amount of deception’ that they purposefully included in their design primarily to reduce costs and logistic demands of conducting the experiment.

    Google Scholar 

  5. The sample size in this study by Glimcher et al. is, however, quite small like in many neuro-imaging experiments: just 8 human subjects playing another human and 8 subjects playing the computer.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

(2007). Internet Experiment. In: Preferences in Negotiations. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 595. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics