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Preferences in Negotiations

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Preferences in Negotiations

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 595))

Abstract

As Bazerman points out, in a negotiation two or more parties are interested in reaching one of several possible agreements, but their preferences over these agreements are not completely identical. In multi-issue negotiations, studied here, parties usually have the possibility to simultaneously negotiate over several issues and to search for integrative potential. Negotiators play a non-constant-sum game.

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Literatur

  1. Furthermore, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for an extensive introduction to game theory in general.

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  2. Auctions are widely used class of market mechanisms and the differentiation to negotiations is not always clear cut. To avoid confusion, it is briefly discussed here. Auctions are market mechanisms with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices based on bids from the market participants (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). Thus, auctions are a special subset of negotiations as they satisfy the above definition of a non-individual decision-making process. Arguments are rare in auctions, but agents resolve a dispute on the allocation of resources by communicating via offers. The difference from auctions to other negotiations lies in the specification of the protocol to be followed: Auctions are negotiations with a well specified and enforceable protocol. Furthermore, they are almost always non-bilateral processes and, thus, not further considered in the present study.

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  3. Comparable collections of biases in negotiations are provided by Neale and Bazerman (1991, Ch. 3 & 4), Bazerman and Neale (1992, Part I), Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley (2000), and Bazerman (2006, Ch. 10).

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  4. A related example of shifting reference points in negotiations is given by Gimpel (2007).

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  5. The notation differs from the original notation used by Compte and Jehiel to gain consistency with the attachment effect model.

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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(2007). Preferences in Negotiations. In: Preferences in Negotiations. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 595. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72338-7_3

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